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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Jessica Lynn Wenzel appeals, challenging her conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance.  Specifically, she claims the district court erred by 
denying her motion to suppress evidence found pursuant to execution of a 
search warrant. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Wenzel with possession of hydrocodone, a controlled 
substance.  (R., pp. 41-42.)  Wenzel moved to suppress all evidence, contending 
the search of her wallet was unlawful.  (R., pp. 75-76, 99-104.)  The district court 
concluded that Wenzel was an overnight guest at a residence when the police 
executed a search warrant there and, pursuant to the warrant, searched 
Wenzel’s purse and wallet.  (R., pp. 120-33.)  The district court concluded that 
the search of the purse and wallet were within the scope of the search authorized 
by the warrant.  (R., pp. 133-36.)   
 Wenzel thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea preserving her right to 
appeal the denial of her suppression motion.  (R., pp. 149-50.)  Wenzel filed an 
appeal timely from the entry of judgment.  (R., pp. 154-57, 162-64.)   





 Wenzel states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Ms. Wenzel’s motion to 
suppress?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Wenzel failed to show any error in the denial of her motion to 
suppress evidence found incident to execution of a search warrant at the 








Wenzel Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress 
Evidence Found Incident To Execution Of A Search Warrant At The Residence 




 The district court applied Idaho precedent and concluded that, because 
she was an overnight guest, the search of Wenzel’s purse was within the scope 
of the search authorized by the search warrant.  (R., pp. 133-36 (citing State v. 
Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878, 820 P.2d 1235 (Ct. App. 1991)).)  Wenzel argues the 
district court erred in its application of the standard adopted by the Idaho courts 
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6), but spends most of her brief requesting application of 
legal standards different than the one applicable in Idaho (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-
12).  Because Wenzel has failed to claim that Idaho precedent should be 
overruled, her argument based on authority outside the jurisdiction is irrelevant.  
The claim of error under applicable Idaho authority is meritless. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. 





C. The Officers Did Not Exceed The Scope Of The Search Warrant Because 
Wenzel Was An Overnight Visitor To The House 
 
 “A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in 
which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility 
that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.”  
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982).  “The Court has generally 
held that the reasonableness of a search’s scope depends only on whether it is 
limited to the area that is capable of concealing the object of the search.”  Safford 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 388 (2009) (Thomas, J. 
dissenting in part). 
Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for 
illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, 
drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found.  A 
warrant to open a footlocker to search for marihuana would also 
authorize the opening of packages found inside.  A warrant to 
search a vehicle would support a search of every part of the vehicle 
that might contain the object of the search.  When a legitimate 
search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been 
precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and 
containers, in the case of a home, or between glove compartments, 
upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a 
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient 
completion of the task at hand. 
 
Ross, 456 U.S. at 821.  
However, a warrant to search premises does not always include within its 
scope the authority to search persons on those premises.  Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U.S. 85, 90-92 (1979).  The holding in Ybarra “turned on the unique, 
significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one’s person.”  
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999).  Because of this heightened 
protection of persons, the authority under a warrant to search “cannot be 
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extended so as to constitute authority to search a person not connected in any 
way with the place being searched, who merely happens to be on the premises, 
and who is not mentioned or described in the affidavit of probable cause upon 
which the warrant was issued.”  Purkey v. Mabey, 33 Idaho 281, 193 P. 79, 79-
80 (1920) (interpreting Idaho Const., art. I, § 17).  As stated by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals: 
[I]n determining whether a search of personal effects violates the 
scope of a premises warrant, the court must consider the 
relationship of the object, the person and the place being searched. 
Under this formula, there is a differentiation between the personal 
effects of a person who is a usual occupant of the premises which 
are to be searched and the personal effects of a transient visitor to 
the premises. The personal effects of an overnight visitor would be 
subject to a search, whereas the personal effects of a mere visitor 
or passerby would not be subject to a search. 
 
State v. Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878, 880, 820 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(emphasis added, citations omitted).  After finding that Wenzel was an overnight 
visitor, the district court properly applied this standard and denied the 
suppression motion.  (R., pp. 133-36.)   
 Wenzel argues that because she was not both an overnight guest and 
described in the warrant application the search of her purse was outside the 
scope of the warrant.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  While it is true that the Court of 
Appeals determined that Bulgin was both an overnight visitor and named in the 
search warrant application, the legal standard it articulated did not require both.  
Bulgin, 120 Idaho at 880-81, 820 P.2d at 1237-38.  Moreover, the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated that a search warrant may not be extended where there is 
both a lack of connection to the place and a lack of mention in the warrant 
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application.  Purkey, 33 Idaho at 281, 193 P. at 79-80.  Under the legal standard 
as articulated by the Idaho appellate courts, either a connection to the property 
such as being an overnight guest or the establishment of particularized probable 
cause in the warrant application includes a person within the scope of a search 
warrant.  Wenzel’s argument that both are required is without basis. 
 Not only is Wenzel’s argument contrary to the standard as articulated in 
Bulgin and Purkey, it makes little logical sense.  Under Wenzel’s proposed 
standard the only resident and sole proprietor of a drug house could avoid the 
search of her purse if she were not named in the warrant application; as could 
the temporary visitor to the drug house even if the state obtained its warrant 
based entirely upon probable cause to believe that she was a drug dealer.   
Wenzel next argues that this Court should adopt a different legal standard 
for when a person may be searched pursuant to a search warrant for particular 
premises.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-13.)  She has not, however, argued that 
Purkey and Bulgin should be overruled.  (Id.)  The Idaho Supreme Court “will 
ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions unless it is shown to have been 
manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise or 
unjust.”  State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations 
omitted); see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 
(1992) (“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly 
wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”).  Because Wenzel has 
not argued that existing precedent should be overturned, she has failed to 
present a viable argument for application of a standard other than that adopted in 
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prior precedents of the Idaho courts.  State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (a party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or 
argument is lacking); State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 
(1983) (the appellate court will not review actions of the district court for which no 
error has been assigned and will not otherwise search the record for errors). 
Both of Wenzel’s arguments fail.  She has failed to show that the district 
court misapplied the law that an overnight visitor is subject to search pursuant to 
a search warrant for the premises and has failed to claim that the law should be 
changed.  She has therefore failed to show that the district court erred when it 
denied her motion to suppress. 
 
D. Alternatively, The District Court Also Reached The Right Result Because 
A Search Of Wenzel’s Purse Was Not A Search Of Her Person 
 
 Even if a search of Wenzel’s person were outside the scope of the search 
authorized by the search warrant, Wenzel failed to demonstrate that a search of 
her purse was a prohibited search of her person.  See McKinney v. State, 
133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (where the lower court reaches 
the correct result by relying on an incorrect legal theory, the appellate court will 
affirm the result under the correct legal theory).  Wenzel notes, quoting Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence in Houghton, 526 U.S. at 308, that purses are “repositories 
of especially personal items that people generally like to keep with them at all 
times” and that Justice Breyer was “tempted to say that a search of a purse 
involves an intrusion so similar to a search of one’s person that the same rule 
should govern both.”  (Appellant’s brief, p 12.)  Two things, however, are missing 
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from Wenzel’s argument.  First, Wenzel fails to mention that Justice Breyer then 
concluded: “However, given this Court’s prior cases, I cannot argue that the fact 
that the container was a purse automatically makes a legal difference, for the 
Court has warned against trying to make that kind of distinction.”  Houghton, 
526 U.S. at 308 (emphasis original).  Justice Breyer ultimately concurred in the 
majority’s rejection of the lower court’s holding that a passenger’s purse was not 
subject to search and the Court’s holding that officers may search any container 
“capable of concealing the object of the search” when searching a car with 
probable cause.  See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299-307 (majority opinion).  
Second, Wenzel also fails to mention Idaho’s precedents on this subject. 
 In State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 979 P.2d 100 (1998), Newsom was 
the passenger in an automobile searched pursuant to the arrest of the driver.  
She challenged the district court’s determination that officers’ search of her 
“purse was lawful incident to the arrest of the driver of the vehicle.”  Id. at 699, 
979 P.2d at 101.  The Court held that the search incident to arrest exception 
“does not authorize the search of another occupant of the automobile merely 
because the other occupant was there when the arrest occurred.”  Id. at 700, 979 
P.2d at 102.  The court noted that Newsom had testified that the purse was on 
her lap, but when she tried to take it with her upon exiting the car the officers 
ordered she leave it behind.  Id.  Under such circumstances “the passenger’s 
purse was entitled to as much privacy and freedom from search and seizure as 
the passenger herself.”  Id. 
 9 
 
 The Court also addressed the search of a passenger’s purse incident to 
the arrest of the driver in State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000).  
In that case, however, unlike in Newsom, Holland voluntarily left her purse 
behind when asked to exit the car.  Id. at 160, 15 P.3d at 1168.  In reaching the 
opposite conclusion as in Newsom, the Court stated that “Newsom stands for the 
proposition that the police cannot create a right to search a container by placing it 
within the passenger compartment of a car or by ordering someone else to place 
it there for them.”  Id. at 163, 15 P.3d at 1171. 
 In State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 178-79, 90 P.3d 926, 928-29 (Ct. App. 
2004), officers arrested an occupant of a car on outstanding warrants. Officers 
ordered Roe, another passenger in the vehicle, to exit so they could search the 
car incident to arrest.  Id. at 179, 90 P.3d at 929.  Roe attempted to leave the 
vehicle holding a pair of shorts, but was ordered to leave the shorts behind.  Id.  
Officers then found controlled substances in the shorts.  Id.  In addressing the 
suppression issue the Court looked at Newsom, Houghton, and Holland and 
concluded that some items like purses “can be considered part of the person, 
much like the clothing a person is wearing,” but held that the shorts in question, 
because they were not being worn, were not part of Roe’s person and therefore 
were more akin to a container in the vehicle and thus properly searched.  Id. at 
182-83, 90 P.3d at 932-33.   
Finally, in State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 357 P.3d 1281 (Ct. App. 
2015), the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the search of a purse that was on 
the seat next to the driver (and only occupant) of a car searched under the 
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automobile exception.  The Court stated the case presented “a very refined 
question: whether Easterday’s purse was a part of her person, and therefore, not 
subject to search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.”  
Id. at 176, 357 P.3d at 1284.  The Court first rejected applicability of cases 
addressing the search incident to arrest exception as opposed to the probable 
cause automobile exception.  Id.  The Court then rejected the proposition that 
different sorts of containers should be treated differently for purposes of the 
automobile exception.  Id. at 176-77, 357 P.3d at 1284-85.  Ultimately, the Court 
of Appeals limited the definition of a search of the person to the person and his or 
her clothing, which did not include the purse.  Id. at 177, 357 P.3d at 1285.   
 Wenzel failed to demonstrate that searching her purse was outside the 
scope of the warrant.  The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a search of a 
purse is not a search of the person.  Easterday, supra.  Even if a purse could be 
deemed part of the person under some circumstances, the district court found 
more credible the officer’s recitation of events, and rejected Wenzel’s claim she 
requested to take her purse with her when she was required to leave the 
premises so the search could be conducted.  (R., p. 128.)  Wenzel failed to 
demonstrate that the search of the purse on the premises subject to a valid 
search warrant was effectively a search of her person outside the scope of the 







 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Wenzel’s judgment of 
conviction. 
 DATED this 9th day of May, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen______ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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